Based just on industrial production, there is little in the timing of the onset of the Great Depression to set the United States apart from the 12 other countries tied for first place. If one wanted to argue that the United States was in some sense earlier than the others, the series to analyze would be some indicator of building activity. Construction was the first sector to weaken in the United States and it weakened sooner here than elsewhere. Of the 11 countries for which the League of Nations provides data on building permits or some other indicator of building plans, only the United States and Belgium peaked in 1928.5 Planned construction did not turn down in countries such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom until 1929 or later.
While the early downturn in construction is one way in which the onset of the Depression in the United States differed from other countries, more important differences involve the immediate severity of the Great Depression in the United States and the peculiar composition of the decline in American output. For most countries, the first year of the Great Depression was a fairly ordinary bad year. Table 1 shows the distribution of the percentage fall in industrial production between 1929 and 1930. The median decline in output for the 15 countries experiencing a decline was just over 9 percent. Industrial production in the United States, in contrast, declined 21 percent in the first 5The building activity data are from the League of Nations (1936, Appendix II, Table 3 , pp. 154-155). In this comparison I only include countries for which the data reflect permits or some other indicator of planned, rather than completed, construction. year of the Depression. Thus, the Depression was "great" in the United States soonier than elsewhere.
Another feature of the American experience in 1930 was that the initial fall in industrial production was more concentrated in consumer goods and less concentrated in investment goods than in many other countries. For example, the ratio of the percentage fall in the production of investment goods to the percentage fall in the production of consumption goods was just over two for the United States, but close to three for Canada and over four for Germany.6 In the United Kingdom, however, the decline in industrial production in 1930 was even more skewed toward consumption goods than in the United States.
As the Great Depression dragged on through 1931 and 1932, nearly all countries experienced a significant depression. However, there was again substantial variation in the peak to trough amplitude across the countries for which the League of Nations collected industrial production data.7 In this contest the United States was a clear loser, with a peak to trough fall in industrial production of 62 percent. Only Poland also experienced a fall in production of this magnitude. The experiences of all of the countries are shown in Part B of Table 1 . As can be seen, Canada, Czechoslovakia, and Germany experienced peak to trough declines in output approaching that of the IJnited States. On the other hand, several major industrial countries, including the United Kingdom, Japan, and Sweden, experienced remarkably mild downturns. For example, the peak to trough decline in industrial production in the United Kingdom was less than a third as large as that in the United States. France had a reasonably large peak to trough fall in production of just over 40 percent, but between the peak in 1929 and the absolute trough in 1935 there was a significant recovery in 1933.
The timing of the trough in industrial production, on which the preceding amplitudes are based, is remarkably similar across countries. Of the 22 countries for which a trough can be identified, 15 reached their lowest point in 1932. Figure 1 , which shows industrial production in the five largest industrial producers, shows that the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom are among the countries that have a trough in 1932. Japan, along with Chile, Finland, New Zealand, and Norway, hit bottom earlier, in 1931. Czechoslovakian industrial production reached its lowest point in 1933 and French industrial production, as just mentioned, did not reach its absolute minimum until 1935. Production in all of the remaining countries reached its lowest level in 1932.
Based on these turning points, there is no evidence that the United States was particularly unusual in the duration of the declining phase of the Depression; most of the industrial world turned around at roughly the same time. The 6These composite indexes of the production of investment goods and current consumption goods are from the League of Nations (1938, Appendix III, The composition of the growth of industrial production during the early recovery in the United States was also somewhat different from that of many other countries. While the initial downturn had been skewed toward a fall in the production of consumer goods, the initial upturn in the United States was skewed toward an increase in the production of investment goods. According to League of Nations statistics, the output of investment goods in the United States rose 42 percent in 1933, while the output of consumer goods rose 10 percent, a ratio of more than four to one. In Japan and the United Kingdom, in contrast, production of investment goods rose only about twice as fast as production of consumption goods, and in France production of investment goods grew less rapidly than production of consumption goods. Germany had a composition of production growth that was similar to that of the United States.
While various countries began their recoveries at roughly the same time, there was much variation in when each economy was (in some sense) fully recovered. A crude measure of the date of recovery is simply the year in which industrial production reached its pre-Depression peak. 
Causes of the American Depression

Framework
At the broadest conceptual level, the Great Depression in the United States can be analyzed quite well with the simple aggregate supply-aggregate demand model familiar to introductory economics students. Between 1929 and 1933, a series of shocks caused aggregate demand to decline repeatedly in the United States. These declines in aggregate demand moved the economy down along an upward-sloping aggregate supply curve. The net result was both progressively worsening unemployment and deflation.
There is substantial disagreement among scholars about why and when the U.S. aggregate supply curve became upward sloping, though nearly all agree that wages and prices were far from perfectly flexible in the 1920s and 1930s. Some studies of price flexibility conclude that wages and prices have been sticky since the turn of the twentieth century, implying that the only thing unique about the Great Depression was the size of the shocks (Allen, 1992; Schultze, 1981; Gordon, 1980 ). Other studies, using different data and different specifications, find that wages and prices did not become less flexible until around the time of the Great Depression (Sachs, 1980; Mitchell, 1985 ; O'Brien, 1989). For example, O'Brien argues that nominal wages became particularly rigid in 1929 and 1930 because firms were mistakenly convinced that maintaining wages would be good for business. He suggests that this belief had its origins in the bankruptcies of the early 1920s and President Hoover's oratory. Other factors often cited as explanations for increased rigidity after World War I are the rise of internal labor markets, which replaced day-to-day wage agreements with set pay scales, and the increasing size and market power of American corporations, which broke the lockstep relationship between costs and prices.9
There is also substantial disagreement about whether more wage and price flexibility would have prevented aggregate demand movements from having the large real effects that they had in the 1930s. In the conventional textbook model a fall in wages and prices raises real balances, lowers interest rates, and thus stimulates investment. The rise in investment serves to counteract at least some of the fall in demand. Tobin (1975) Table 2 also re-emphasizes how unimportant net exports were to the onset of the Great Depression in the United States. The fall in net exports in 1930 accounted for just 2 percent of the total decline in real GNP. This is much smaller than the contribution of net exports in the three recessions just before the Great Depression.'3 This suggests that the international downturn had little feedback effect on the U.S. economy through American exports.
The most likely source of the precipitous drop in American consumption following the stock market crash in 1929 is the crash itself. In a previous paper, I showed that the stock market crash in October 1929 and the subsequent gyrations of stock prices through the middle of 1930 generated tremendous uncertainty about future income; the stock price movements did not necessarily 13This result also holds if one examines exports rather than net exports. Real exports accounted for just under 10 percent of the decline in real GNP in 1930. In 1914 they accounted for 11 percent of the fall in GNP; in 1917 they accounted for 51 percent; and in 1921 they accounted for 53 percent. make consumers and investors pessimistic about the future, only highly uncertain (Romer, 1990 ). This uncertainty is clearly reflected in the forecasts made by contemporary analysts. Not only was there more variation across forecasts of future income immediately following the Great Crash, but the analysts expressed great uncertainty about their forecasts and speculated that consumers and businessmen felt the same way.
The effect of this uncertainty was that consumers and producers immediately cut their spending on irreversible durable goods as they waited for additional information about the future. This effect is seen most clearly in the fact that department store sales and automobile registrations declined precipitously in November and December 1929, while grocery store sales and ten-cent store sales actually rose; this is exactly what one would expect if consumers were shying away from irreversible goods but had not substantially changed their point estimates of future income. The role of the stock market crash in causing the decline in consumer purchases of durable goods is also seen in regressions of the output of consumer durables on total output, lagged output, wealth, and stock market volatility (Romer, 1990, p. 610). The coefficients from such regressions suggest that stock market volatility has a significant negative effect on the output of consumer durables and that the tremendous rise in volatility in late 1929 and early 1930 can more than account for all of the fall in the production of consumer durables in 1930.14 In addition to its effect through uncertainty, the stock market crash may also have depressed consumer spending by decreasing wealth (Temin, 1976) This increase in high-powered money led to an increase in M1 of almost the same amount: MI increased 49 percent between April 1933 and April 1937. That M1 did not increase by more than the base is evidence that the money supply was growing during the mid-1930s because of policy decisions and political events in Europe, rather than because of endogenous changes in the money multiplier caused by the recovery itself. Temin and Wigmore (1990) argue that, even before the money supply actually increased, devaluation helped to spur recovery by signalling the switch to a more expansionary monetary regime. They suggest that devaluation immediately stimulated purchases of farm equipment and other capital goods by generating expectations of future monetary ease, inflation, and real economic growth.
After 1934 the huge increases in the American money supply had exactly the effect on the U.S. economy that a traditional aggregate supply-aggregate demand model would lead one to predict. Figure 3 shows that real interest rates plummeted in response to the gold inflows. This came about because nominal rates fell slightly and actual and expected inflation rose substantially (the producer price index rose at over 8 percent per year between January 1933 and January 1937). This fall in real interest rates was followed fairly quickly by a recovery of interest-sensitive spending, such as construction spending and consumer purchases of durable goods. This effect can be seen in the fact that the American recovery, more than in other countries, was led by a surge in the output of investment goods. One piece of evidence that suggests a causal link between the fall in interest rates and the surge in particular types of spending in the United States is the fact that American consumer spending on durable goods turned around before consumer spending on services. This indicates that some factor that affected only durables purchases, such as a fall in interest rates, was initiating the recovery. 16 That increases in the money supply generated the recovery suggests that movements in aggregate demand were as important for ending the Great Depression in the United States as they were for causing it. However, there is an obvious question about whether the increase in the U.S. money supply during the recovery should be considered an accident caused by international developments or the predictable result of conscious American policy. The right interpretation, I believe, is a mixture of both. The political upheaval in Europe that caused gold to flow to the United States was clearly an international shock. Indeed, there is a very real sense in which the tension leading up to the outbreak of World War II in Europe did help to end the American Depression by causing the U.S. money stock to grow.
On the other hand, Johnson (1939) shows that the Roosevelt administration consciously chose to devalue and not to sterilize the subsequent gold inflows, precisely because it wanted to increase the money supply and cause inflation. In this way, the international gold flows may simply have provided a convenient way for the executive branch to bypass the overly cautious Federal Reserve. In the absence of such gold flows, Roosevelt and the Congress would quite possibly have used the threat of amending the Federal Reserve's operating procedures to force the Federal Reserve to increase the money supply. However, devaluation was clearly important in any case, because no country could pursue a wildly expansionary monetary policy for a sustained period and 16The monetary expansion and the concurrent restructuring of the banking system could also have stimulated construction and investment through increased credit availability. still maintain a fixed exchange rate. Thus, as argued by Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) , the decision to abandon the old gold parity was a crucial precondition for recovery.
Conclusion
The American Depression was unique in many ways. While many countries experienced a depression at roughly the same time as the United States, the onset of decline and the subsequent rebound were much more extreme in the United States than elsewhere. The overall depth of the Great Depression was also larger in the United States than in any country other than Poland. Finally, the American Depression was initiated by a fall in consumption and ended by a rise in investment to a degree that was quite different from the experience of many other industrial countries.
The 
